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Fasten Your Seatbelts 
FORUM 
FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELTS 
Alan R. Bender 
Thinking outside the box is anathema to the 75-year-old U.S. airline business. This seriously palsied industry will need 
to rethink strategy if it is going to survive unpunished after the dust settles fiom recent merger talks and customer 
service calamities. 
Essentially all deregulation era airline inhustry studies indicate that the traditional U.S. air carriers--the American's, 
Delta's, and United'-ling to  life due only to marketing prowess, government protectionism, and airport gate 
monopolization. Their existence certainly isn't a function of their service product-which grows measurably worse 
by the day. Indeed, today's airline product borders on garbage, and that reality can cost the carriers terribly. Even a 
commodity business like air transportation is vulnerable to customer rebellion. The only question is "When?" 
During the 20+ years of deregulation the older airlines 
have succeed& only in building very shaky survival 
strategies. Unable to function-as other commodity 
businesses do--by managing unit costs, traditional air 
carriers compete by developing elaborate pricing 
mechanisms (highly discriminatory fares), sophisticated 
kickback schemes (fiequent flier programs), and 
monopolistic infrastructure strangleholds (airport hubs). 
The old airlines have little choice; their intractable size and 
inflexible labor agreements doom them to focusing on the 
revenue side of the house, an exceptionally problematical 
strategy in a commodity business. 
Who would posit a business calamity while U.S. air 
carriers enjoy near-full planes and very respectable profits? 
I would. Severe problems commonly occur when an 
industry ignores public opinion and immerses itself in 
denial. Big tobacco provides a case in point. . 
The deplorable state of America's air transportation 
system is mainly the fault of the carriers, but no one would 
know it by the sound bites emanating fiom the airlines' 
public relations departments. Flights always late? Blame 
the FAA. Meals inedible? Blame discount f$res. Ticket 
prices too high? Blame OPEC. Customers drunk and 
unruly? Blame society. Frankly, that kind of hubris puts 
Microsoft to shame. 
Let's face facts, this is 1960sera GM, Ford, and Chrysler 
masqueradiig as today's United, American, and Delta. 
The problem is, without the airline equivalents of Toyota, 
Honda, and Mercedes in the U.S. aviation marketplace-it 
is illegal for foreign air carriers to operate within the United 
States--the big airlines have nary a care in the world. 
Their only serious initations come fiom occasional 
skirmishes with pint-size upstart carriers and some fancy 
dancing around low cost colossus Southwest Airlines. 
Frankly, this is American business at its worst: closed 
markets, strong-armed labor unions, and locked-up 
infiastrudure all rolled into one. Someone please wake me 
up and tell me this isn't 1950! 
Proposed couplings such as the United-US Airways deal 
are so manifestly threatening as to beg for the immediate 
legalization of cabotage: domestic flying by foreign 
carriers. Singapore Airlines, for example, can and would 
bring the big U.S. carriers to their knees in many domestic 
air markets including New York-Los Angeles and Chicage 
San Francisco. At the very least the celebrated Asian 
carrier would embarrass the U.S. bullies into substantially 
improving the quality of their domestic service product. 
Even if cabotage were never to become a fait accompli7 the 
controversy emanating fiom its serious discussion on 
Capitol Hill would force the airline industry's neck-deep 
muck to the surhct+an absolute necessity given public 
wrath over the state of air transportation in the United 
states. 
Regrettably, insouciance has been a trademark of U.S. 
airline firms since at least the 1930s. Deregulation was 
supposed to transport the traditional air carriers-kicking 
and screaming--to a new reality, but instead it is the 
American public begging for mercy. Chalk one up for big 
business. 
Still, industry maverick Southwest Airlines-and its 
canny record of success-provides evidence that satisfied 
customers, respectable profits, and happy employees are not 
mutually exclusive properties in the airline business. 
Conversely, the persistence of the old economy mega- 
carriers demonstrates that even highly inefficient 
companies are a whole lot smarter than government 
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policymakers. And one thing is absolutely certain: Airline 
deregulation would have been a slam dunk failure long ago 
were it not far Southwest Airlines' inestimable presence in 
the domestic marketplace. 
Which leads us back to the inseparable issues of merger 
' 
mania and the future of the U.S. airline industry. Can 
inefficient tirms survive primarily by abusing and 
overcharging the public? Of- they can, though none 
of the big airlines would have had that awlid capacity were 
it not for Washington's long-standing record of complicity 
and incompetence. 
Once again the ball is in the iovernment's court. 
Unethical practices can be exposed, fi-ozen infi-astructure 
can be thawed, and federal protection can be removed once 
and for all. Many of these remedies-along with 
others-were outlined in a recent National Research 
Council Special Report. 
In the meantime, passengers-pecially business 
people--can vote with both their hands and their feet. 
They can contact their elected representatives and tell them 
that they are fed up '  with poor airline service and 
unnecessarily discriminatory fares. And they can throw 
some business in the direction ofsmall upstart carriers even 
if that means losing a few fiequent flier perks in the 
process. Some folks might even consider the fractional 
ownership of corporate aircraft-or even 
"telecommuting"-whenever those options appear h i b l e .  
The U.S. air carriers' self-serving media blitz isn't 
fooling anyone. It is already clear to most passengers that 
the big airlines don't give a hoot about providing a decent * 
product at a fair price; the carriers are interested only in 
grandiose empire building and, of course, their all- 
important attachments to Washington's protectionist apron 
strings. Once carriers fully comprehend the swelling public 
outrage they will almost certainly recant their merger 
initiatives-at least for now. A word to Congress: h 7 t  let 
them off so easily this time.0 
Alan R Bender holds a Ph.D. fiom the University of California at Berkeley. He is an Associate Professor of Aeronautical 
Science for the extended campus of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
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